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Flight MH370 Speculation

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Why?
or your suggestion is being 'shilled' against by the posters here for nefarious reasons.
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I find this just as disturbing since I never said anything of the such nor did I imply it.
I should address this as I don't like misunderstandings. You are right you weren't implying the 'shill' angle, that was an unfortunate interpretation on my part because I've been reading ATS a little too long - if you had posted that there it would be understood that you would be hinting strongly at some behind the scenes attempt to cover-up or divert inquiry. This is metabunk though and not ATS, so I understand you just find the idea disturbing on a personal level.

I would reiterate that I think you are being disturbed for the wrong reasons and it's an unnecessary response. Especially on this site, anything put forward that has some real-world science-based objection will be pointed out, hence why those more familiar with the on-board systems and protocol (pilots) are pointing out where the idea falls short.

I don't think it implies that pilots object to the general concept. But it's also understandable that pilots need to have all options available to them in case of unforeseen emergencies and taking away that control can be dangerous.
I'm sure there's a work around available with further thought, but it's natural they point out the shortcomings of any proposal first, so no need to be disturbed. And remember this is a highly visible incident in a field where thousands of flights happen everyday without such a problem.
 
I wouldnt want to pay a dime more for a false sense of security . Whats the point of security when the pilots themselves could be the terrorist ? Or the ground crew ? Or through the food suppliers to airports such as Atlanta s Airport ? If you fly you know the risk which is less then traveling to the airport by car . We spend billions a year on TSA for what ? I leave Melborne Fl I have to go through naked body scanner and separate my liquids and take off my shoes . 2 days later I leave Ronald Reagan airport Near DC and just walk through a metal detector as we did in the seventies and Im done ? I only know of 2 kamikaze airline pilots and the only thing they had in common was their religion .
I take your paranoia and mistrust in anyone who tells you what you have to do with a grain of salt now. Boohoo you had to take your shoes off. Get over it!
 
I wouldnt want to pay a dime more for a false sense of security . Whats the point of security when the pilots themselves could be the terrorist ? Or the ground crew ? Or through the food suppliers to airports such as Atlanta s Airport ? If you fly you know the risk which is less then traveling to the airport by car . We spend billions a year on TSA for what ? I leave Melborne Fl I have to go through naked body scanner and separate my liquids and take off my shoes . 2 days later I leave Ronald Reagan airport Near DC and just walk through a metal detector as we did in the seventies and Im done ? I only know of 2 kamikaze airline pilots and the only thing they had in common was their religion .

I actually agree. Personal bias maybe, but it always chapped my ass that we (as flight crew) were required to endure the same charade.

Knowing (as I do) about things that i would never write into a public arena.
 
I should address this as I don't like misunderstandings. You are right you weren't implying the 'shill' angle, that was an unfortunate interpretation on my part because I've been reading ATS a little too long - if you had posted that there it would be understood that you would be hinting strongly at some behind the scenes attempt to cover-up or divert inquiry. This is metabunk though and not ATS, so I understand you just find the idea disturbing on a personal level.

I would reiterate that I think you are being disturbed for the wrong reasons and it's an unnecessary response. Especially on this site, anything put forward that has some real-world science-based objection will be pointed out, hence why those more familiar with the on-board systems and protocol (pilots) are pointing out where the idea falls short.

I don't think it implies that pilots object to the general concept. But it's also understandable that pilots need to have all options available to them in case of unforeseen emergencies and taking away that control can be dangerous.
I'm sure there's a work around available with further thought, but it's natural they point out the shortcomings of any proposal first, so no need to be disturbed. And remember this is a highly visible incident in a field where thousands of flights happen everyday without such a problem.
What I find disturbing is the idea that there is no solution. That it doesn't matter what is implemented because it can just be circumvented by flipping a switch. There should be no excuses why a planes position can not be known with relative ease after this.

Maybe someone with better researching skills can find this out.

How many incidents have happened which required the transponder to be switched off (in flight) as the solution to the problem?
 
I actually agree. Personal bias maybe, but it always chapped my ass that we (as flight crew) were required to endure the same charade.

Knowing (as I do) about things that i would never write into a public arena.
Some people get set in their ways and are unable to see past bias. Also disturbing.
 
How many incidents have happened which required the transponder to be switched off (in flight) as the solution to the problem?

'Soulfly', this is somewhat irrelevant since transponders work in the VHF spectrum and are limited to line-of-sight reception. And also, even if they were designed as you ask, then all that would be needed is for someone with an ulterior motive to change the squawk code. A random four-digit code (out of possible 4,000+) wouldn't attract any particular attention, even if it was received by ground radar stations. Of course, there is that probability that a criminal (in theory) could accidentally choose a code that happened to be the same as another that was already assigned, and in the ATC facility's computer system...OR, this same criminal could just squawk a VFR code (1200 or 1400). Etc.

Perhaps you could answer it though?

Without some research, I can (off top of my head) envision a scenario where an airplane has, say, unreliable airspeed and another airplane is available to fly formation, as a guide. In that case, for ATC convenience, it would be advisable for only one airplane to have a transponder transmitting. This is but one of those "what ifs?" that were mentioned up-thread.
 
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'Soulfly', this is somewhat irrelevant since transponders work in the VHF spectrum and are limited to line-of-sight reception. And also, even if they were designed as you ask, then all that would be needed is for someone with an ulterior motive to change the squawk code. A random four-digit code (out of possible 4,000+) wouldn't attract any particular attention, even if it was received by ground radar stations. Of course, there is that probability that a criminal (in theory) could accidentally choose a code that happened to be the same as another that was already assigned, and in the ATC facility's computer system...OR, this same criminal could just squawk a VFR code (1200 or 1400). Etc.
Perhaps you could answer it though?
 
How many incidents have happened which required the transponder to be switched off (in flight) as the solution to the problem?
that's what I was going to say. Perhaps people are misunderstanding you/us.

if that one switch which is already there couldn't be shut off (like you said how many fires have started because of it?) as easily, we wouldn't have wasted a week looking in the wrong area. Yes they would have lost the plane tracking as it went out to sea but we would have known where it wasn't.
and the chances of finding the black box or some clue as to what happened (to prevent further mishaps...perhaps [hail] got stuck in the engine and its something that needs to be fixed on all planes... would be greater. Not perfect, just greater.

Yes the people would still be dead. That isn't the point. Or at least put a fake breaker and the real breaker somewhere only a pilot would know about so we could rule out scenarios.
 
If the transponder had not been turned off it is most likely that two weeks would not have been wasted on wild goose chases to figure out the plane flew out into the Indian Ocean. It wouldn't have told us where exactly, but we would have known where to look a lot sooner. Anyone should be able to see that being able to turn off a planes tracking abilities is now a fundamental flaw in safety.
 
Yes the people would still be dead. That isn't the point. Or at least put a fake breaker and the real breaker somewhere only a pilot would know about so we could rule out scenarios.
Pilot wants to commit suicide but then changes mind and lands in ocean in attempt to save everyone but weeks go by with no rescue because "oh well we need to be able to turn that off".
 
If the transponder had not been turned off it is most likely that two weeks would not have been wasted on wild goose chases

Again, we cannot really assert this as a "guarantee" either. As mentioned, a random four-digit code that was not assigned within the relevant ATC computer would show up, but be anonymous for all intents. Keeping in mind that as far as radar is concerned (and line-of sight, remember), the countries bordering the oceans and seas in that region have sophisticated radar that doesn't rely on a transponder. But, for their own security and secrecy rules, they don't divulge the extent of their capabilities publicly.
 
Again, we cannot really assert this as a "guarantee" either. As mentioned, a random four-digit code that was not assigned within the relevant ATC computer would show up, but be anonymous for all intents. Keeping in mind that as far as radar is concerned (and line-of sight, remember), the countries bordering the oceans and seas in that region have sophisticated radar that doesn't rely on a transponder. But, for their own security and secrecy rules, they don't divulge the extent of their capabilities publicly.
Okay I get it, you want total control. No need to beat the dead horse as you like to say. You know my opinion.
 
Pilot wants to commit suicide but then changes mind and lands in ocean in attempt to save everyone but weeks go by with no rescue because "oh well we need to be able to turn that off"

No, this isn't logical at all. IF he (as you are just free-thinking here) "changed his mind" and decided to ditch, there are numerous ways to have communicated and made his location known!! SATCOM, for one! The HF radios, on emergency frequencies. VHF on emergency, to any airplane that was in line-of-sight range (much farther for an airborne transmitter than ground-based). Etc.
 
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No, this isn't logical at all. IF he (as you are just free-thinking here) "changed his mind" and decided to ditch, there are numerous ways to have communicated and made his location known!! SATCOM, for one! The HF radios, on emergency frequencies. VHF on emergency, to any airplane that was in line-of-sight range (much farther for an airborne transmitter than ground-based). Etc.
Okay.. just move on...
 
'Soulfly', this is somewhat irrelevant since transponders work in the VHF spectrum and are limited to line-of-sight reception. And also, even if they were designed as you ask, then all that would be needed is for someone with an ulterior motive to change the squawk code. A random four-digit code (out of possible 4,000+) wouldn't attract any particular attention, even if it was received by ground radar stations. Of course, there is that probability that a criminal (in theory) could accidentally choose a code that happened to be the same as another that was already assigned, and in the ATC facility's computer system...OR, this same criminal could just squawk a VFR code (1200 or 1400). Etc.
So basically, no one has any idea of where the plane is when its beyond the line of sight radar systems. The position of these planes when flying over the expanses of ocean or uninhabited land are up to the pilot to radio where they are. That doesn't seem very secure, and it obviously requires a great deal of trust.
 
If it would have been known on the first day, go look in the southern Indian Ocean then there is a much greater chance of rescue than, well now. Like I said it wouldn't have told use where exactly but there wouldn't have been time wasted. The transponder going off enabled this plane to go missing.
 
If it would have been known on the first day, go look in the southern Indian Ocean then there is a much greater chance of rescue than, well now. Like I said it wouldn't have told use where exactly but there wouldn't have been time wasted. The transponder going off enabled this plane to go missing.
And that in there lies the truth Soulfly! Malaysia really screwed this one up, and they obviously weren't prepared to do a real investigation. I bet its not uncommon for a lot of nations who don't have the funding or training to not be prepared in this same situation. As someone noted this isn't a "free" government and they try to keep things under wraps. They should've asked for help immediately, and if I remember correctly Fox news was reporting the day after that they got a tip from the CIA that the plan continued on for 4 or so hours, but it was quickly dismissed and in turn they ended up searching the wrong waters. The reaction time of malaysia could've increased the likeliness of us finding the plane as well.
 
The position of these planes when flying over the expanses of ocean or uninhabited land are up to the pilot to radio where they are.

Yes, although may very well change in future ( and this will no doubt make 'Soulfly' happy ;) ).

I envision the ADS-B technology to allow more surveillance by ATC when the transponders are out of VHF range.

("What's your vector, Victor?" "Oveur, over." "Roger, Roger." "Dunne!"

That doesn't seem very secure, and it obviously requires a great deal of trust.

It's worked well for many, many decades.
 
Once any airplane is more that about 200 miles from an ATC radar antenna, turning it off makes little difference.
But it was determined that the plane made course changes after the transponder was turned off and was still within range of being able to be tracked. The plane turned south and from the maps most likely flew back over land after making those course changes. In this situation the transponder being on would have greatly helped to determine last vector victor.
 
Yes, although may very well change in future ( and this will no doubt make 'Soulfly' happy ;) ).

I envision the ADS-B technology to allow more surveillance by ATC when the transponders are out of VHF range.

("What's your vector, Victor?" "Oveur, over." "Roger, Roger." "Dunne!"



It's worked well for many, many decades.
Why wouldn't this make anyone happy? Besides the it will cost money reason!
 
Oh, I see you didn't understand when I mentioned the 1st time. The code has to be changeable by the flight crew. This is indisputable.
I understand perfectly.

So you make it so the code can only be changed on the ground and not in flight. Or is that still giving up too much control for you too?

What excuse is there for that?
 
NO, because it must be changeable in flight, too.
Could you explain why?

What happens if someone changes the code (in flight) to something they are not supposed to change it to?
Do red flags not pop up that someone has changed a code for some unknown reason?
What would be the advantage for someone doing harm to change the code instead of turning the transponder off?
 
I understand perfectly.

So you make it so the code can only be changed on the ground and not in flight. Or is that still giving up too much control for you too?

What excuse is there for that?

You'd have to change the entire way transponder codes work, and the entire system of how ATC uses and tracks them, re-train all the controllers, and install new equipment in every plane, and retrain the maintenance crews - all for a relatively minor improvement.

It would be like the UK switching which side of the road they drive on, just so fewer French tourists are killed.
 
Could you explain why?

Because there are only 4096 possible codes. They need to be shared amongst the various regions, and all the planes aloft, and the codes must be unique, with no possibility of two planes in the same region having the same code. Different adjacent regions, and different operating environments, will have different sets of codes, so when you go from one region to another, you change to the code they give you.

If you don't do that, there are not enough codes to go around.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transponder_(aviation)#Transponder_codes
 
Could you explain why?

What happens if someone changes the code (in flight) to something they are not supposed to change it to?
Do red flags not pop up that someone has changed a code for some unknown reason?
What would be the advantage for someone doing harm to change the code instead of turning the transponder off?

First and foremost reason to change is pretty mundane --- code duplication. Say a jet is leaving New York for Los Angeles. Assigned a squawk (let's say) 7035. It departs and is airborne enroute. Two hours later, another flight somewhere in the west (could be anywhere) is assigned the same code (these are assigned randomly as part of your IFR clearance). Second flight takes off, headed eastbound. Eventually those two flights may end up being in the same ATC sector, and thus the same code. Therefore, one is asked to change it. This is done by the controllers.

No red flags, unless 7700 is selected. That is an emergency code. 7600 and 7500 are "Loss of communications" (radio) and "Hijacking", respectively. All three cause specific alerts on the radar screens.
 
You'd have to change the entire way transponder codes work, and the entire system of how ATC uses and tracks them, re-train all the controllers, and install new equipment in every plane, and retrain the maintenance crews - all for a relatively minor improvement.

It would be like the UK switching which side of the road they drive on, just so fewer French tourists are killed.
My tiff isn't, "is my idea going to work" but that it is a fundamental flaw and should be fixed. What ever that way is a planes position should be tracked. The resistance to that idea is baffling.
 
First and foremost reason to change is pretty mundane --- code duplication. Say a jet is leaving New York for Los Angeles. Assigned a squawk (let's say) 7035. It departs and is airborne enroute. Two hours later, another flight somewhere in the west (could be anywhere) is assigned the same code (these are assigned randomly as part of your IFR clearance). Second flight takes off, headed eastbound. Eventually those two flights may end up being in the same ATC sector, and thus the same code. Therefore, one is asked to change it. This is done by the controllers.

No red flags, unless 7700 is selected. That is an emergency code. 7600 and 7500 are "Loss of communications" (radio) and "Hijacking", respectively. All three cause specific alerts on the radar screens.
Is it really that hard to find a way to make it so no two codes are used on the same day?
 
Is it really that hard to find a way to make it so no two codes are used on the same day?

Well, just speaking to the contiguous USA. Take a look at the number of discrete flights per day: (Compare also to Europe.)

On an average day, air traffic controllers handle 28,537 commercial flights (major and regional airlines), 27,178 general aviation flights (private planes), 24,548 air taxi flights (planes for hire), 5,260 military flights and 2,148 air cargo flights (Federal Express, UPS, etc.).
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http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20061207081929AAgwh5P
 
Is it really that hard to find a way to make it so no two codes are used on the same day?

It's impossible, as there are far more planes flying in a day (80,000+ according to WW's source) than there are codes (<4,000 when special uses are removed)

Anecdotally, when I did my long distance solo, just 400 miles, I'm pretty sure I changed codes at least ten times.
http://mickwest.com/flying_lessons/lesson051.htm
 
Again...IF it could not be turned off, and they just changed the squawk code, then same result.
Well, just speaking to the contiguous USA. Take a look at the number of discrete flights per day. Compare also to Europe.

On an average day, air traffic controllers handle 28,537 commercial flights (major and regional airlines), 27,178 general aviation flights (private planes), 24,548 air taxi flights (planes for hire), 5,260 military flights and 2,148 air cargo flights (Federal Express, UPS, etc.).
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http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20061207081929AAgwh5P
I think the simple answer is to go to a 5 digit code, maybe that would solve the riddle? Or is the xpndr only capable of having 4 digits entered into it at a time
 
Well, just speaking to the contiguous USA. Take a look at the number of discrete flights per day: (Compare also to Europe.)

On an average day, air traffic controllers handle 28,537 commercial flights (major and regional airlines), 27,178 general aviation flights (private planes), 24,548 air taxi flights (planes for hire), 5,260 military flights and 2,148 air cargo flights (Federal Express, UPS, etc.).
Content from External Source
http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20061207081929AAgwh5P
Or how about each plane having their own assigned code from day one until the plane is no longer in service. Is something like that possible. Each plane registers with the FAA or who ever to get their Xpnder code, much in the same way we register vehicles. That number stays with them forever, but you would need at least 5 digits to make that possible or even a 6 digit code
 
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